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CASE NOTES
If ... neither party knew of that fact, then it becomes the duty of the pur-
chaser to have advised himself as to whether or not such an ordinance was in
existence.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the doctrine of
frustration is an attempted defense by a disappointed party to a contract
who finds his required performance possible, but undesirable, in that the
forseeable object contemplated by both parties has become unforseeably
no longer obtainable. This doctrine has been universally rejected by
American courts of last resort. The contract remains possible of perform-
ance, as in the instant case, and mere disappointment in the final outcome
of the bargain, or failure to adequately and wisely draft contracts, or to
investigate existing laws which are clearly forseeable, offer no legal de-
fense to a contract.
CRIMINAL LAW-ABILITY TO RESIST PSYCHOLOGICAL
COERCION A FACTOR IN DETERMINING
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF CONFESSION
Fikes, an uneducated Negro of low mentality, was picked up by Selma,
Alabama police and charged with breaking and entering the apartment
of the mayor's daughter and attempting to rape her. Booked on an "open
charge of investigation," Fikes was not taken before a magistrate per
Alabama law but was locked up in the Selma jail the night of the arrest.
The following morning police officers questioned petitioner for three
hours. The next day he was questioned for another two hours in the
morning, and that afternoon he was taken to Kilby State Prison, roughly
fifty-five miles from Selma. At the prison there were several hours of
interrogation and similar questioning for two more days, after which
Fikes confessed. Counsel was admitted after the confession was obtained,
marking the first time Fikes had come in contact with anyone other than
the police officers, the sheriff of Selma, and his employer. At no time
prior to the first confession was Fikes allowed to see relatives or friends.
After another week of similar interrogation Fikes gave a second confes-
sion. He was subsequently convicted in a trial in which the evidence
against him consisted of the challenged confessions and two witnesses who
testified that petitioner had previously attacked them. The mayor's
daughter failed to identify petitioner as her assailant. Petitioner's convic-
tion was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama, which in turn was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court holding that the failure
to take the defendant before a magistrate and the incarceration in isolation
for a week of questioning, coupled with defendant's low mentality, ren-
dered the confessions obtained thereby involuntary and their use a vio-
lation of petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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In Ingram v. State,' the Alabama Supreme Court held that unlawful
detention of a prisoner from the magistrate, in and of itself, does not ren-
der inadmissible a confession secured during such detention. The court
in the instant case, while acknowledging the holding of the Ingram case,
indicated that Stein v. People was important in deciding the case at hand.
In the Stein case, in which there was admittedly unlawful detention,
the court noted that ". . . such an occurence is relevant circumstantial
evidence in the inquiry as to physical or psychological coercion." 2 The
court also assumed a position paralleling that of United States v. Mitchell,
where it was held that ". . the mere fact that a confession was made while
in the custody of the police does not render it inadmissible"; 3 and Lisenba
v. California, where the court noted that ". . . the fact of illegal delay
may be relevant to the question of whether or not it denied due process
but is not conclusive"; 4 and People v. Alex, in which it was said that
... even where the police illegally delay arraignment after arrest, .. . the
confession is admissible unless made under the influence of fear.",
The preceding cases represent an unbroken current of authority that
remained firm until the upheaval caused by the so-called McNabbO rule,
which rendered inadmissible, as a matter of law, any confession obtained
in conjunction with an unlawful detention from a magistrate. In a subse-
quent case, Upshaw v. U.S., Mr. Justice Reed said in reference to the
McNabb case: "The police were no longer left free to enforce the law by
disobeying the law. '7 The Supreme Court, however, has seen fit in later
cases to retreat from the rigidity of McNabb, stating in the instant case,
as in United States v. Mitchell," that the entire circumstances surrounding
the confession obtained must be considered and the mere fact that the
confession was obtained during an unlawful detention is not conclusive of
its inadmissibility. "The question is controlled by the whole body of cir-
cumstances accompanying illegal detention." As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
observed in a concurring opinion in the present case: "No single one of
1 252 Ala. 497, 42 So. 2d 36 (1949). In the Ingram decision, the Alabama court noted
that the Federal rule that confessions are inadmissible if made during illegal detention,
due to failure to promptly carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, is not bind-
ing upon state courts.
2 Stein v. People, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1952).
3 322 U.S. 65, 69 (1944). The court quoted with approval language used in McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
4 314 U.S. 219, 235 (1941).
5 255 N.Y. 192, 193, 192 N.E. 289, 290 (1934).
6 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
7 335 U.S. 410, 430 (1948).
8 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
9 Ingram v. State, 252 Ala. 497, 499, 42 So. 2d 36, 38 (1949).
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these circumstances alone would in my opinion justify a reversal."' 0 It is
apparent that Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred because the detention of
the prisoner, for all intents and purposes, was virtually incommunicado,
and there was a failure to arraign the petitioner.
Fundamental to the problem of confessions is whether the confession
is a product of reasoned choice or psychological or physical coercion."
If the latter is present, the confession is involuntary and is excluded be-
cause the truth value is indeterminable and it is untrustworthy. 2 Obvi-
ously, some consideration must be given to the defendant's mental capacity
so as to determine whether under the circumstances he was able to resist
the pressure applied. If he was, other things being equal, the confession
cannot be said to be necessarily coerced. On the other hand, if the defend-
ant is mentally deranged or of low mental capacity it may be that the
interrogation had a greater effect than it would have had upon a person
of normal intelligence.
In the majority opinion in the instant case, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
noted that it is ". . . highly material to the question before this court to
ascertain petitioner's character and background.. . There was testimony
by three psychiatrists at the trial . . . to the effect that petitioner is a
schizophrenic and highly suggestible.' 13 It would seem, then, that the
court placed no little weight on Fikes' mental capacity. Mental capacity of
any sort affects the weight to be given a confession, and if it is of a serious
character it may render a confession inadmissible.' 4 Of course, the court
did not rely solely on petitioner's mental incapacity but considered it in
the light of weight given to mental capacity in previous decisions.
Mr. Justice Harlan, and the Justices who joined him in the dissent,' 5
raised serious objections to the conclusion subscribed to by the majority
of the court. He noted that there was no evidence of physical brutality
and that ". . . psychological coercion is by no means manifest."'" In sup-
port of the minority position, it should be noted that previous cases dis-
allowing confessions because of psychological coercion have been based
not only on the failure to arraign, but also on the extreme length of the
questioning periods. In the leading case of Watts v. Indiana,1" the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction based on a confession extracted from the
prisoner by way of relay-team interrogation tactics. Relentless question-
10 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957).
11 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
12 People v. Fox, 319 Il. 606, 150 N.E. 347 (1925).
18 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957).
14 State v. Phelps, 138 La. 10, 69 So. 856 (1915).
15 Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Reed joined in the dissent.
16 352 U.S. 191, 200 (1957).
17 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
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ing for sequential hours determined whether the pressure was so great as
to cause the confession to be involuntary. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said
in Watts, ". . . there is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much
affected by force as by fear." ' In Harris v. State,19 which followed in the
wake of the Watts decision, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction in
which a confession was used that had been obtained after defendant had
been confined in a small, hot room, interrogated intermittently through-
out the day and night, and police threatened to arrest his mother. And in
Haley v. Ohio,20 the Supreme Court found coercion which the court said
should have barred admission of the confession. The defendant in that
case was interrogated by relays of police several times, and, on one oc-
casion, from noon until five o'clock the following morning. In addition,
there was some evidence that the defendant was beaten.
In none of the cases preceding the instant case were the defendants al-
lowed to see counsel or friends, and in each case questioning was pro-
tracted and relentless. Yet the majority stated that notwithstanding the
absence of physical brutality and long, continuous interrogation, the fail-
ure to take the defendant before a magistrate coupled with his incarcera-
tion in isolation for a week of questioning and his weak mental ability
made the confessions thus obtained involuntary. It is apparent then that
the majority is tending toward, if not the rationale, certainly the effect of
the McNabb doctrine.21 While on the one hand acknowledging that a
confession is not inadmissible merely because it was obtained prior to ar-
raignment, the court expands its criteria for determining what constitutes
psychological coercion abandoning, in effect, the relentless, relay-team
type investigation as the touchstone to determine psychological coercion.
It will be interesting to observe the effect this decision has upon standard
operating procedures of law enforcement agencies. It would seem that the
concept of Due Process of Law has once again been expanded and rede-
fined so as to require police officials to more rigorously observe the con-
stitutional rights of those taken into custody. If the concept has been
broadened, the avenues of expansion are clear. The circumstances which
the courts will use in determining whether a confession should be ad-
mitted into evidence are: (1) the will-power of the defendant and the
amount of pressure applied thereto; (2) the defendant's mentality and its
effect on the validity of his confession; (3) the presence or absence of re-
lay-team interrogation; (4) the failure to promptly arraign the defendant;
(5) the denial of the right to counsel; (6) the failure to allow defendant
to consult with friends, and (7) the length of time the defendant is held
for questioning.
18 Ibid., at p. 52. 19 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
20 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
21 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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The above criteria amplify the spirit of previous decisions, all of which
have adhered to the proposition that "[a] confession by which life be-
comes forfeit must be the expression of free choice. '22
22 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
JURIES-FAILURE TO SELECT WOMEN FOR
JURY PANEL DOES NOT DEPRIVE MALE
DEFENDANT OF FAIR TRIAL
Sylvester Winfield was convicted of transporting liquor to a dry area
with punishment set at two years in jail and a fine of $2,000. Defendant
contended that error was committed because no women were selected for
the jury panel. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that regardless of
any discrimination defendant did not show that he was prejudiced by it.
The dissenting judge, however, thought that to have anything less than a
cross-section of the community represented in the jury list was to deny
defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial and was a violation of
Texas statute. Winfield v. State, 293 S.W. 2d 765 (Tex., 1956).
Alleged error based on discrimination in jury selection appears with in-
creasing frequency as a basis for appeal. Intentional and systematic exclu-
sion based on race,1 national origin,2 and occupational status8 have been
the contentions in most of the cases. The problem concerning women
jurors is relatively new.
The common-law definition of "jury" or "trial by jury" did not con-
cern itself with the problem as to whether women were qualified as jur-
ors. 4 In regard to sex, the general definition was twelve men.5 It was in-
conceivable any woman needed to serve, could serve,6 or indeed, wanted
to serve as a juror. But the modern concept of "man" as a generic term
has pervaded the law so that women are now generally recognized as qual-
ified jurors.7 In Ballard v. United States,8 the United States Supreme Court
has gone so far as to say that in cases originating in the federal courts,
women must be on the jury lists. It has adopted a "cross-section of the
1 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
2 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
8 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company, 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
4 In rare instances women sat in judgment to determine whether a convicted defend-
ant was pregnant. Anne Wycherly's case, 8 C. & P. 262.
5 Smith v. Times Publishing Company, 178 Pa. 481, 36 Ad. 296 (1897); N. Wagman
& Company v. Schafer Motor Freight Service, 167 Misc. 681, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 526 (1938);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N.E. 685 (1921).
6 People v. Moe, 381 Ill. 235, 44 N.E. 2d 864 (1942), wherein the defense unsuccess-
fully contended that the inclusion of women would prejudice him.
7 People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N.W. 423 (1920).
8 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946).
